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Totalitarianism
or Peace: Herbert
Hoover and the Road
to War, 1939-1941
Gaty Dean Best
THE ASSAULTS ON THE STATUS QUO IN EUROPE AND ASIA IN THE
late 1930s brought former President Herbert Hoover to a promi-
nent position in the debates over U.S. foreign policy. The re-
sponse of one of America's leading conservatives was predict-
able in view of the policies of his administration at the time of
the Manchurian Incident. The wave of international lawlessness
which followed that incident, shattering the inter-war treaty
structure upon which the world had pinned its hopes for peace,
did not lead Hoover to re-evaluate the consequences of his
policies of 1931-32. Rather the episode confirmed his belief that
the United States should avoid involvement in such conflicts.
Commenting on the invasion of China by the Japanese in late
1937, he said: "There are plenty of ways that we can establish
our honor and our dignity without going to war over questions of
this sort. I am not particularly a pacifist, but I have felt that
war should be resolved as the answer to assaults upon our na-
tional freedom and this alone."' Three weeks later he told a
meeting of Republican women that "democratic government
now, and for many years to come, probably could not stand the
'Letter, Hoover to Bainbridge Colby. December 23, 1937, Hoover Papers, Post-Presidential
Individual, Hoover Presidential Library, hereafter cited as HP.
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shock of another great war and survive as a democracy." The
United States should prepare herself to "fight for our indepen-
dence to the last shred of our material and physical strength,"
but such strength should be used only to defend the Western
Hemisphere and not to "prevent or end other peoples' wars."
Nor should the United States participate in any economic ac-
tions to that end, but it should "co-operate with other nations to
exert moral force and build pacific agencies to preserve peace or
end conflict in the world."^ Largely as a result, apparently, of
his outspoken opposition to American involvement in the war,
Hoover's popularity rose noticeably in early 1938. His appear-
ance in movie newsreels evoked applause, and a public opinion
poll in June showed him the second choice of Republicans, trail-
ing Arthur Vandenberg, but leading the 1936 candidate, Alf
Landon.'
The 1938 off-year elections brought Robert A. Taft to the
U.S. Senate in 1939. Taft, son of former President William
Howard Taft, had served under Hoover in Europe in the Ameri-
can Relief Administration after World War I, and had main-
tained his friendship with "the Chief ever since. Taft quickly
began to echo Hoover's foreign policy views in the Senate. Other
allies also took up the fight, notably Senator Styles Bridges of
New Hampshire who, like Hoover, argued that "above all
things, America must keep out of war."" Other allies came to
Hoover in the unsuccessful fight against repeal of the neutrality
law in 1939. By the end of the year. Hoover and Taft had espe-
cially become close, consulting with one another on foreign
policy questions. Meantime, so closely were Hoover and Bridges
cooperating on the fight over neutrality, at one point Bridges
introduced as his own an amendment that had been largely
drafted by Hoover. Similar requests for draft amendments were
coming to Hoover from Senator Arthur Vandenberg.'
'Reprinted as "American Policies for Peace," in Herbert Hoover, Addresses Upon the
American Road, 1933-1938 (New York, 1938), 300-308.
'Letter, Raymond Clapper to George Carlin, April 14, 1938, Clapper Papers, Library of
Congress; Arch Shaw to Hoover, June 9, 1938, HP.
'Letter, Bridges to Hoover, February 18, 1939, HP; "America Needs a Foreign Policy:
Address of Senator Styles Bridges on NBC, February 20, 1939," HP.
'Letter, Taft to Hoover, September 5, 1939; Bridges to Hoover, October 10, 1939; Hoover
to Bridges, October 11, 1939, with copy of amendment introduced; Hoover to Vandenberg,
October 12, 1939, all in HP.
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The participation of the Soviet Union in the invasion of
Poland confirmed Hoover's long-time suspicion and hatred of
the Soviet Union's communist government. In an article in Col-
lier's magazine. Hoover charged that the Soviet invasion of
Poland and her attacks on Latvia, Estonia and Finland revealed
the bankruptcy of the Roosevelt administration's policy of
recognizing the USSR in 1933, breaking with sixteen years of
non-recognition by Democratic and Republican administrations
alike. Considering her aggression in Europe together with alleged
attempts at subversion within the United States itself. Hoover
concluded that recognition of the USSR was a "gigantic politi-
cal and moral mistake." He did not suggest the withdrawal of
recognition, as such an action might be misinterpreted as "war-
like," but he did suggest leaving the U.S. Embassy in Moscow
in the hands ofa charge d'affaires, and he asked of his country-
men: "Why are we more tender of tyranny in Communist Russia
than in Nazi Germany?"*
By 1940, Hoover had formed a geopolitical view which was in
conflict with that prevailing in much of the United States, and
certainly in the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
The Roosevelt administration regarded Nazi Germany, Fascist
Italy, and Imperial Japan as the great threats to the status quo
and, ultimately, to American security. For Hoover, the greatest
threat to the world and to the United States was the Soviet Union
and its support of international communism. According to this
view, Germany and Japan represented the two forces containing
Soviet expansion. Destruction of them would deliver much of
the world to communism.' This view was not unique with
Hoover. It had been expressed as early as 1935 by John V. A.
MacMurray in a memorandum for the State Department.' But
it now contributed to the motivation of the former president in
rallying public opposition to the drift toward American partici-
pation in the war against Germany.
The winter of 1940-41 saw a losing battle by Hoover, Taft
and others against the proposed Lend-Lease Act. Although he
'Reprinted as "Russian Misadventure," in Hoover, Further Addresses Upon The American
Road, 1938-1940 (New York, 1940), 158-171.
'Letter, Felix M. Morley oral history. Hoover Presidential Library.
"Quoted in George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago, 1951), 48.
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refused to join the America First Committee—the anti-interven-
tionist group headed by General Robert E. Wood—Hoover
cooperated closely with them in the fight.' Hoover was already
convinced that President Roosevelt was bent on taking the
United States into the European War. Given the overwhelming
Democratic strength in Congress, the best that opponents of war
could hope for was to reduce the president's options through
amendments, or to gain time by delaying passage ofthe bill. As
for Hoover, he was widely accepted as the leader of Republican
opposition to the bill. As he put it himself:
I have been in constant communication with Republicans in the House
and Senate. We are developing a definite program. We have secured a
continuous stream of able radio speakers and have more coming up. I
think we are going to defeat the big issue in this bill, that is giving the
President the power to make war.'"
Hoover refused to concede that the Germans posed any
immediate threat to the United States. When he met with Secre-
tary of State Cordell Hull in February, 1941, Hoover recorded:
[Hull] referred to the Germans as determined to conquer the entire
world. That if England fell, they would at once bring South America into
their economic or political axis and then they would attack us. I said that
if we were speculating, I had entirely another thesis—that was that they
had no intention of any attack on the Western Hemisphere, at least for a
very long time. That it was my view that it was their determination to
dominate Russia after they had settled with the British. I recited my im-
pressions from discussions with them in 1938 where I saw many evidences
of their interest in Russia. That Russia and the Balkans together pos-
sessed far greater undeveloped resources than the whole Western Hemis-
phere, that the Germans were a land people, a soldier people not a sea
people, that Russia could be had with two Army Corps, while the West-
ern Hemisphere would require gigantic sea equipment."
While Hoover's assessment of Germany's military strength was
faulty, his prophecy was superior to Hull's own view of the
future. And for Hoover Communist Russia was clearly accept-
able as a direction for German expansion. If the United States
stayed out of such a war, perhaps the two totalitarian dictator-
ships would spend their strength in battling one another.
'Letter, Hoover to R. Douglas Stuart, Jr., December 6, 1940, HP.
'"Letter, Hoover to Taft, January 6, 1941; Hoover to Walter Newton, January 25, 1941;
Robert E. Wood to Hoover, February 7, 1941, all in HP.
""Memorandum of a meeting with Hull at 9:30 on February 28, 1941," in HP.
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For Hoover the most serious totalitarian threat to the United
States was an internal one, and one that would be immeasurably
assisted in its goals if the United States entered the war, and
war-time regimentation was delivered into the hands of New
Dealers. At Yale University he recalled for his listeners the his-
tory of the United States during World War I;
Whatever the fine phrases were in which we wrapped these actions, the
cold fact was that government in business was Socialism, and government
dictation to private owners was Fascism. The word Fascism had not then
been invented. The freedom of labor and the freedom of the farmer were
driven a long way down that blind alley. When people attempted to stand
on their so-called rights, propaganda, intolerance and penalties of a law
were directed to drive them to cover. Taxes which expropriated savings,
pressure loans and inflation were necessary. All that is the method of
Fascism. Is it to be the tragic jeopardy of democracy that if it would go to
war, it must adopt the very systems which we abhor?'^
A few weeks before the 1940 presidential election. Hoover
charged that: "This administration is steadily developing the
same growth of personal power that has swept the world into
Nazism and Fascism."'^ Clearly, Hoover feared that the war-
time regimentation which had been ended after World War I by
President Woodrow Wilson, would not be surrendered so easily
by the New Deal leaders if they were once able to institute it.
Later, when the United States had already entered the war,
Hoover wrote GOP Congressional leader Joseph Martin that the
Republican party must "stop the use of war measures to per-
manently collectivize this country."'"
When, in June, 1941, the German armies poured into the
Soviet Union, as Hoover had predicted they would, he was fur-
nished with a strong new reason why the United States should
avoid participation in the European war. The Russian Revolu-
tion in 1917 had affected the perceptions of many concerning
World War I. Slogans supporting a war in defense of democracy
had a hollow ring as long as one of those nations allied against
the Germans had been the widely despised Czarist government
of Russia. But the revolution of 1917 changed that view to one of
democracy against autocracy. The Bolshevik take-over later that
'^Reprinted as "The Question of Peace," in Hoover, Addresses Upon the American Road,
1940-1941 (New York, 1941), 66.
'^San Francisco News, October 22, 1940.
'"Letter, Hoover to Joe Martin, November 6, 1942, HP.
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Hoover as he appeared in 1933
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year, however, gave the lie to that view of the war. But in 1941,
events in Russia again contributed to an altered perception of
another war. What had to this time been in many minds a war
by nazism and fascism against freedom was now transformed, in
the eyes of Hoover and others, into a war in which the principal
antagonists were two totalitarian dictatorships—Nazi Germany
and Communist Russia.
Soon after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, both
Taft and Hoover delivered radio speeches outlining the altered
situation. Taft's speech, on June 25,1941, argued that "it would
be contrary to the future welfare and happiness of the people of
this country for us to intervene in the war now proceeding. . . . "
Interpreting arguments in favor of American participation in
the war as "a belief in our divine appointment to reform the
world," Taft called them bankrupt and ludicrous. He cited the
recent transformation of the conflict through the German inva-
sion of the Soviet Union as confirmation of his conclusion. The
war was no longer between totalitarian states and democracies,
but rather a war between totalitarian states. This was so, Taft
maintained, despite the efforts of the Roosevelt administration
to influence public opinion in transforming the image of Greece
and China and Brazil and the Soviet Union into democracies,
even while all the time "they were governed without question by
dictators." How could the United States aid the USSR when
"no country was more responsible for the present war and Ger-
many's aggression than Russia itself." It was the Russian pact
with Germany which had freed the Germans to undertake their
aggression against Poland and their war against France and
Great Britain. What's more, "Russia proved to be as much of
an aggressor as Germany itself." How could the United States,
in the name of democracy, make an alliance "with the most
ruthless dictator in the world?"
Could there be a greater travesty on the false propaganda fed to the
American people than that this is a great moral issue between ideologies?
If Hitler wins, it is a victory for fascism. If Stalin wins, it is a victory for
communism. From that point of ideology, there is no choice. But the vic-
tory of communism in the world would be far more dangerous to the
United States than the victory of fascism.
Taft asserted that "communism masquerades, often success-
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fully, under the guise of democracy, though just as alien to
our principles as nazism itself." Thus, while as false a philoso-
phy as nazism or fascism, it appealed to more people. If the
United States would stay clear of the conflict, the German inva-
sion of the Soviet Union might turn out to be the solution to the
problems of the world. The Germans seemed to have turned
from the objective of capturing the British Isles. The United
States ought to continue supplying the British and to try to
make peace between Germany and Great Britain, but it ought
to stay out of the war. Taft concluded that: "The Russian war
has weakened every argument for intervention."'^
Hoover pronounced Taft's a "good speech," and sent him a
copy of his own, which followed Taft's by four days.'* Hoover
told the American people he found it curious that the German
invasion of the Soviet Union had led to an intensification of the
"propaganda of fear or hate" designed to draw the United
States into the war. He recognized that it was sensible for Great
Britain and the Soviet Union to cooperate against their common
enemy, now that the Soviet Union had been invaded by Britain's
enemy, but he argued that the same invasion "makes the whole
argument of our joining the war to bring the four freedoms to
mankind a gargantuan jest." Before the Roosevelt administra-
tion, the United States had for sixteen years, under four Ameri-
can presidents and four secretaries of state, refused to recognize
the Soviet Union because it was "one of the bloodiest tyrannies
and terrors ever erected in history."
It destroyed every semblance of human rights and human liberty; it is a
militant destroyer of the worship of God. It brutally executes millions of
innocent people without the semblance of justice. It has enslaved the rest.
Moreover, it has violated every international covenant, it has carried on a
world conspiracy against all democracies including the United States.
In violation of its pledge to the United States at the time of U.S.
recognition, the Soviet Union had carried out systematic subver-
sion in this country, as revealed by the Dies Committee. "Is the
""Broadcast by Robert A. Taft over Columbia Broadcasting System, June 25, 1941," HP.
The Wall Street Journal of same date expressed similar sentiments in describing the Russo-Ger-
man war as between "Tweedledum and Tweedledee."
"Letter, Hoover to Taft, June 27, 1941, Taft Papers, Library of Congress.
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word of Stalin any better than the word of Hitler?" Hoover
asked his listeners.''
Hoover pointed to the agreement of 1939, between Stalin and
Hitler under which "Stalin attacked the Poles jointly with Hitler
and destroyed the freedom of a great and democratic people."
Two weeks later the Soviet Union had put an end to democracy
and freedom in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, and three
months later she had attacked democratic Finland. If the
United States now joined the war and helped the Soviet Union to
win, she would "have won for Stalin the grip of communism on
Russia, the enslavement of nations, and more opportunity for it
to extend in the world." Instead, the United States should adopt
a policy of "watchful waiting, armed to the teeth, while these
men exhaust themselves." Then, the United States, as the most
powerful nation in the world, could make her voice heard. She
could do so only if she did not become enfeebled by participa-
tion in the struggle. And to align herself with the Soviet Union
would cause the United States to lose all moral force, since "to
align American ideals alongside Stalin will be as great a viola-
tion of everything American as to align ourselves with Hitler."
Instead, the United States should "give every aid we can to Bri-
tain and China within the law, but . . . not put the American
flag or American boys in the zone of war." The United States
should "arm to the teeth" for the defense ofthe Americas and
concentrate not on imposing freedoms on other peoples, but on
"improving the four freedoms within our borders that the light
of their success may stir the peoples of the world to their adop-
tion." "Here in America," he argued, "is the only remaining
sanctuary of freedom, the last oasis of civilization and the last
reserve of moral and economic strength. It must be
preserved."'*
Privately, Hoover was convinced that "Germany will defeat
Russia and dispose ofthat infecting center of Communism." He
believed that Hitler would then propose peace to the British on
terms that the latter would be able to accept." Moreover, he be-
"Reprinted as "A Call to American Reason," in Hoover, Addresses Upon The American
Road. ¡940-1941. 87-102.
"Ibid.
"Letter, Hoover to John Callan O'Laughlin, June 26, 1941, O'Laughlin Papers, Library of
Congress, hereafter cited as OP.
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lieved that were it not for the alignment of the United States in a
stance favorable to the Soviet Union, a satisfactory arrangement
might be made with Japan in Siberia. The collapse of the USSR
would furnish the opportunity for a defiection of Japanese ex-
pansion away from the south, where it might threaten American
interests, and toward the north. As Hoover put it, "It would re-
lieve [Japan] of the terrible menace of the Vladivostok air bases
—which relief they have a right to—and would give them a vast
populated area into which to expand. I have just the hunch they
would give up everything south of the Great Wall if they could
get this and peace."^^ According to Hoover, American interests
would be better served if eastern Siberia and Vladivostok were
in the hands of Japan, than of Germany.^'
Coincidental with his June 29th speech. Hoover was becom-
ing involved in the construction and release of a joint statement
by prominent Americans opposing the drift of the United States
in the direction of war. Apparently it was the changed circum-
stances in the war which prompted Hoover's interest in such a
statement now. Robert A. Taft and other Congressional oppo-
nents of war were not invited to participate in the statement, as
the intent was to mobilize opinion outside of Congress. Hoover
made numerous suggestions which were incorporated in the final
draft of the statement, and it was released, finally, in early Au-
gust of 1941. Despite efforts to obtain the signatures of leading
Democrats, no Democrat of stature participated in the state-
ment, although labor leader John L. Lewis did add his signature.
The principal signatories were Republican leaders like Governor
Landon, Governor Frank Lowden, former vice president
Charles G. Dawes, and Hoover. The final statement read:
The American people should insistently demand that Congress put a stop
to step-by-step projection of the United States into undeclared war. Con-
gress has not only the sole power to declare war but also the power and
responsibility to keep the country out of war unless and until both Houses
have otherwise decided. Exceeding its expressed purpose, the lease-lend
bill has been followed by naval action, by military occupation of bases
outside the Western Hemisphere, by promise of unauthorized'aid to
Russia, and by other belligerent moves. Such warlike steps, in no case
sanctioned by Congress, undermine its constitutional powers and the
"Hoover to O'Laughlin, September 6, 1941, OP.
''Hoover to O'Laughlin, October 19, 1941, OP.
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fundamental principles of democratic government. . . . We hold that in
giving generous aid to these democracies . . . we have gone as far as is
consistent either with law, with sentiment or with security. Recent events
raise doubts that this war is a clear-cut issue of liberty and democracy. It
is not purely a world conflict between tyranny and freedom. The Anglo-
Russian alliance has dissipated that illusion. Insofar as this is a war of
power-politics, the American people want no part in it. American partici-
pation is far more likely to destroy democracy in this country and thus in
the Western Hemisphere than to establish it in Europe. The hope of
civilization now rests primarily upon the preservation of freedom and
democracy in the United States. . . . Few people honestly believe that the
Axis now, or will in the future be in a position to threaten the indepen-
dence of any part of this hemisphere if our defenses are concentrated on
the defense of our own liberties. Freedom in America does not depend on
the outcome of struggles for material power between other nations."
Thus, the statement re-emphasized Hoover's point that the war
was not one between tyranny and freedom, but between two
varieties of totalitarianism.
Hoover continued his attack against Roosevelt's policies. In
mid-September he went on the air to tell the American people:
I hold, and 99 per cent of Americans hold, that totalitarianism, whether
Nazism or Communism, is abominable. Both forms are unmoral because
they deny religion, and there is no sanctity of agreement with them. They
are abhorrent because of their unspeakable cruelty and their callous
slaughter of millions of human beings. I abhor any American compro-
mise or alliance with either one of them. A cold survey of this world situa-
tion will show that the dangers of ultimate totalitarian success are very
much less than even ten weeks ago. The fratricidal war between Hitler
and Stalin is daily weakening both dictators. . . . We are assured that
Hitler cannot cross the English Channel with his armies. And England is
even more impregnable because of this breathing spell for production of
more planes, tanks and ships and our increasing aid in war tools. . . .
The actual dangers to America are less today than at any time since the
war began. Less even than three months ago.
Yet Roosevelt was rapidly driving the United States closer to war
through such devices as the Atlantic Charter with Churchill,
Hoover reviewed the World War I experience and told his listen-
ers that the United States "should not again sacrifice our sons
for proved will-o'-the-wisp." The United States should practice
"The correspondence on this statement is in Foreign Policy File, HP, Post-Presidential
Subject Files; the statement itself was printed in New York Times. August 6, 1941.
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neither isolation nor intervention. It should aid the democracies
short of going to war."
Hoover's last major address before the bombing of Pearl
Harbor was on November 19th when he launched yet another
attack on the steady march toward war. By now it appeared that
Hoover's prediction was coming true, that the Soviet Union
might before long be brought to defeat by the German Army.
Hoover, however, was able to find even in the prospect of a
Soviet defeat, proof that the United States ought to avoid par-
ticipation in the war. On the one hand, the failure of the Soviet
Union to contain the German armies, even with her "10 million
men, 20 thousand tanks, 20 thousand planes, fighting on her
own soil behind her own fortifications, with her transportation
wholly over land and on inside lines," made clear the folly of
any attempt by the United States to bring the war to an end by
the use of military power. The best strategy was to let the war
continue, if it must, without the United States involved. Al-
ready the German empire consisted of 230 million alien subjects
who hated their German masters. If the Soviet Union were de-
feated, that total would be swollen by an additional hundred
million. Hoover did not believe that Hitler would be overcome
by internal revolts, but he did believe that the forces working
against him from within would be more successful in destroying
Hitler's dreams than would military attacks or economic block-
ades. Meanwhile, however, there was in Hoover's position no
sympathy for the plight of the Soviet Union and no identifica-
tion with it as an enemy of nazism. Rather, communism con-
tinued to be identified with its enemies, as an enemy of the
United States. Said Hoover: "We want the end of these evil and
brutal ideas of Nazism, Fascism and Communism.""
At least as early as February, 1938, Hoover was concerned
that Roosevelt was seeking to involve the United States in con-
flict with Japan." The abrogation of the U.S. commercial treaty
with Japan in mid-1939 left Hoover with "a foreboding that we
have taken on a situation from which sooner or later we will see
"Reprinted as "The Crisis," in Hoover, Addresses Upon the American Road, 1940-1941,
103-114.
""Shall We Send Armies to Europe? And a Way to National Unity," in Public Statements,
1941, HP.
"Hoover to O'Laughlin, February 8, 1938, OP.
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outrages upon American citizens and other incidents which will
inflame the country and draw us into war in the east." If it was
Roosevelt's desire to go to war with Japan, then the abrogation
was "one step on the road."" When the Roosevelt administra-
tion cut off scrap iron and high octane gasoline exports to
Japan, Hoover viewed it as "again only sticking a pin in a rattle-
snake." In Hoover's opinion, "Either we should leave this thing
alone, or we will be drawn into real trouble."" If the Japanese
had only been left alone "these past three years, they would have
gone to pieces internally. There is nothing so good for the dicta-
tors of Japan as outside pressure."" Hoover did not sympathize
with Japan's occupation of Indochina, and he supported Roose-
velt's actions in response to that occupation, but he felt that
"Roosevelt's continuous sticking vocal pins in this tiger" had
contributed to Japan's action and made a solution more diffi-
cult. Still, he hoped that a modus vivendi might be reached with
the Japanese." Three weeks before Pearl Harbor, Hoover wrote
John Callan O'Laughlin that: "There is no sense in having a
war with Japan. But I am afraid that our people are so anxious
to get into the war somewhere that they will project it. They know
there will be less public resistance to this than to expeditionary
forces to Europe."^" Three weeks later, as the result of the
Japanese attack, the United States was locked in a war against
German nazism, Italian fascism, and Japanese imperialism,
with the Communists of the Soviet Union as allies.
Hoover's opposition to participation in World War II
stemmed from diverse causes. Certainly his Quaker background
led him to view war as a last resort, to be entered into only as an
act of self-defense. His intimate experience with the futile
American crusade in World War I made him chary of new calls
for intervention to save Europe from itself. But a prominent fac-
tor in Hoover's opposition to American participation in World
War II was his perception of the totalitarian alternatives which
seemed to be posed by that war. Support of Nazi Germany and
to O'Laughlin, July 31, 1939. OP.
to O'Laughlin, August 5, 1940, OP.
to O'Laughlin, August 3, 1941, OP.
to O'Laughlin. August 30, 1941, OP.
to O'Laughlin, November 16, 1941, OP.
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Fascist Italy was clearly anathema to Hoover, as it was to most
other Americans. But for Hoover, American support of Com-
munist Russia, another totalitarian government, was equally
objectionable—in some ways more so. Furthermore, Hoover's
memories ofthe regimentation in America during World War I,
were coupled with bis very real concern over the greater regi-
mentation he feared in a second world war under the New Deal.
In Hoover's view, war would not save democracy and freedom in
the United States, but extinguish it. The United States could re-
main a bastion of freedom in tbe world only by staying aloof
from this war between totalitarian states.
-^  J. 1
Hoover testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Ser-
vices Committees in February 1951. He still opposed involving the U.S. in a
land war overseas.
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